1 2 3 4 5	Helmut Kah Attorney at Law Woodinville, WA 98072-9001 Phone: 425-949-8357 Fax: 425-949-4679 Cell: 206-234-7798 Email: helmut.kah@att.net	Honorable Samuel J. Steiner, Judge Hearing Location: Seattle Courtroom 8206 Hearing Date: February 26, 2010 Hearing Time: 9:30 a.m. Response Date: February 19, 2010		
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9	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE			
LO	WESTERN DISTRICT			
L1	In re:	CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCY		
L2	JACK CARLTON CRAMER, JR.,	Case No. 09-15167-SJS		
L3 L4	Debtor.	DEBTOR'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM STAY		
L5	I. Introduction			
L6	COMES NOW the Debtor, Jack C. Cramer, Jr., by and through his attorney Helmut Kah, and			
L7	hereby responds to the Motion for Relief from Stay filed by Litton Loan Servicing which is scheduled			
L8	for hearing on Friday, February 19, 2010.			
L9	Before the court is a motion for relief from the automatic stay of § 362(a) to enforce a deed of			
20	trust on the Debtor's residence.			
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22	The motion is brought by the law firm of Rou	th Crabtree Olsen, P.S., in the name of		
23	"Residential Funding Real Estate Holding, LLC through its servicing agent Litton Loan Servicing, LP			
24	its successors in interest, agents, assigns and assignor	rs ("Creditor")"		
	The motion is neither brought in the name of	the real party in interest, nor by anyone with		

1	standing th	parafore the motion for reliaf from stay should be DENIED
2	_	herefore the motion for relief from stay should be DENIED.
3	For	the sake of clarity and style, the moving parties herein are referred to as follows:
4		Litton Loan Servicing, LP: "Litton"
5		Residential Funding Real Estate Holding, LLC: "RFREH"
6		II. Summary
7	The	motion for relief from stay is supported solely by the affidavit of a person identified as
8	Nancy Rex	ford, Bankruptcy Specialist for Litton Loan Servicing. Attached to her two-page declaration
9	are unauthenticated copies of:	
10	1.	Adjustable rate note dated December 22, 2001, Lynnwood, Washington, providing for an
11		initial interest rate of 11.50% adjustable to a maximum rate of 17.5%;
12	2.	Adjustable rate mortgage note addendum dated December 22, 2001;
13	3.	Note Allonge reciting "pay to the Order of PRISM MORTGAGE COMPANY"
14		purportedly signed by one Ronald Barzano, Assistant Vice President, Mortgage Market, Inc., an Oregon Corporation;
15	4.	Note Allonge reciting "pay to the Order of COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC."
16		purportedly signed by one Ronald Barzano, Assistant Vice President, Prism Mortgage Company, an Illinois Corporation, on which appears what looks like a rubber stamp
17		endorsement in blank by Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.;
18	5.	Deed of Trust dated December 22, 2000 in favor of Mortgage Market, Inc., an Oregon
19		Corporation (as "Lender"); the beneficiary is identified as Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, INC. ("MERS"), a Delaware Corporation, solely as nominee for
20		Lender, as hereinafter defined, and Lender's successors and assigns, with an adjustable rate rider.
21	The	motion mentions the automatic stay, touches upon issues of standing, real party in interest,
22	holder hold	der in due course, and note indorsed in blank. It mentions the Debtor's bankruptcy filing, the
23		
24	Debtor's al	leged default, provides an estimate of the obligation, mentions other liens and the value of
	the property	y, argues that "Creditor" is entitled to relief under § 362(d)(1) & (d)(2), and request that this
	Court enter	an order terminating the stay, and asks that the provisions of F.R.B.P. 4001(a)(3) be waived
		HELMUT KAH, Attorney at Law 16818 140 th Avenue NE

1	The Creditor's proposed order includes provisions that are neither requested nor argued for in the		
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3	motion.		
4	No evidence is provided, nor is any assertion even made, regarding Litton's authority to act for		
5	the holder of the note, beyond the unelaborated statement that the motion is brought by Litton as		
6	servicing agent for RFREH.		
7	Debtor objects to Litton's motion on the basis that neither Litton nor RFREH are shown to be		
8	the holder of the promissory note nor the real party in interest and, therefore, have no standing to bring		
9	this motion.		
10	Furthermore, the Creditor has submitted no evidence whatsoever in support of the factual		
11	assertions made under Sections V and VI of the motion.		
12	III. Issues		
13	III. Issues		
14	A. Real Party in Interest		
15	Is a "servicing agent" the real party in interest in whose name a relief from stay motion may be		
16	brought?		
17	B. Standing		
18	Do either Litton or RFREH have standing to seek relief from stay to enforce Debtors' deed of		
19	trust?		
20	IV. Analysis		
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22	A. Real Party in Interest		
23	The motion names the moving party as "Residential Funding Real Estate Holding, LLC through		
24	its servicing agent Litton Loan Servicing, LP its successors in interest, agents, and assignors		
	("Creditor")".		
	Who is the party bringing this motion? Is it Residential Funding Real Estate Holding, LLC? Is HELMUT KAH, Attorney at Law		

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it Litton Loan Servicing, LP? Or is it some combination of either or both entities' or their "successors in interest, agents, and assignors"?

The real party in interest in relief from stay is whoever is entitled to enforce the obligation sought to be enforced. It follows that orders granting relief from stay must do so to the holder of the obligation to be enforced - not the servicer or others, or the collective "Creditor" as in the proposed order submitted by movant.

B. Standing

Litton has submitted no evidence that it is authorized to act for whomever holds the note, or that RFREH is the holder of the note. These deficiencies put the "Creditor" s standing in question, See In re Parrish, 326 B.R. 708, 720-21 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005). The Court has an independent duty to determine whether it has jurisdiction over matters that come before it. FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990). The Court must determine whether Litton Loan Servicing as agent for Residential Funding Real Estate Holding, LLC (or "Creditor") has standing to seek relief from stay.

1. Law: For a federal court to have jurisdiction, the litigant must have constitutional standing, which requires an injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 551 (1996).

> [T]he question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues. Standing doctrine embraces several judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal raising another person's legal rights

Typically... The standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination of a complaint's allegations to ascertain whether the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.

Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750-52 (1984) (citations omitted). Constitutional standing, predicated

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on the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III of the Constitution, is a threshold jurisdictional requirement, and cannot be waived. *Pershing Park Villas Homeowners Ass'n v. United Pacific Ins.*Co., 219 F.3d 895, 899-900 (9th Cir. 2000).

A litigant must also have "prudential standing," which stems from rules of practice limiting the exercise of federal jurisdiction to further considerations such as orderly management of the judicial system. *Pershing Park*, 219 F.3d at 899-900; *In re Godon*, 275 B.R. 555, 564-565 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2002) (citing *Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.*, 475 U.S. 534, 541-42 (1986).

Generally, a party without the legal right under applicable substantive law to enforce the obligation at issue, or pursuing an interest outside those protected by the law invoked or abstract questions more appropriately addressed legislatively, lacks prudential standing. *Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc.*, 524 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2008).

Under the Bankruptcy Code, a party seeking relief from stay must establish entitlement to that relief. § 362(d); see *In re Hayes*, 393 B.R. 259, 266-267 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008). Foreclosure agents and servicers do not automatically have standing, *In re Scott*, 376 B.R. 285, 290 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007); *Hwang*, 396 B.R. at 767, and must show authority to act for the party which does.

In Washington, only the holder of the obligation secured by the deed of trust is entitled to foreclose. RCW 61.24.005(2) defines "beneficiary" under a deed of trust as the holder of the instrument or document evidencing the obligations secured by the deed of trust. See also *Fidelity & Deposit Co*. *Of Maryland v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.*, 88 Wash. App. 64, 943 P.2d 710 (1997). Having an assignment of the deed of trust is not sufficient, id. At 68-69, because the security follows the obligation secured, rather than the other way around. This principle is neither new nor unique to Washington:

[T]ransfer of the note carries with it the security, without any formal assignment or delivery, or even mention of the latter.

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2	the subject of the testimony." Vinhnee, 336 B.R. at 448 (citation omitted). The testimony must contain		
3	information warranting the conclusion that the proffered records are what they purport to be. Id.		
4	The only evidence which Litton has submitted is the declaration of one of its bankruptcy		
5	specialists named Nancy Rexford. The initial paragraph of the declaration reads:		
6	"I am employed as a Bankruptcy Specialist for Litton Loan Servicing LP the loan servicing agent ("Servicer") for Residential Funding Real Estate Holding, LLC ("Creditor"). I am familiar with the process by which Servicer		
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8	maintains its loan records. I am competent to review loan records and evaluate status based upon those records. I personally know that the records		
9	kept are in the course of regularly conducted business and are a matter of the business routine. Entries in the records are made at or near the time of the		
10	event recorded by or with information from a person with knowledge of the event recorded."		
11	Declaration of Nancy Rexford in Support.		
12	Ms. Rexford makes no claim that any of the matters to which she testifies are matters found		
13	within the business records of her employer, Litton Loan Servicing, or for that matter, the records of		
14 15	Litton's principal, Residential Funding Real Estate Holding, LLC. (RFREH)		
16	It is patently obvious that declarant Rexford has no admissible basis for her inadmissible legal		
17	conclusions and hearsay statements, including the following:		
18	 "[O]n December 22, 2000, the debtor executed and delivered a Note to Mortgage 		
19	Market, Inc." [hearsay not within the business record exception]		
20	• "The Note represents the debtor's promise to pay \$272,000.00 to Mortgage Market, Inc."		
21	[a legal conclusion which the bankruptcy specialist is not qualified to express]		
22	"Mortgage Market, Inc., specially indorsed the Promissory Note to Prism Mortgage		
23	Company." [hearsay not within the business record exception]		
24	 "Prism Mortgage Company specially indorsed the Promissory Note to Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." [hearsay not within the business record exception] 		

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- "Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. indorsed the Promissory Note in blank." [hearsay not within the business record exception]
- "Creditor is now the holder of the Original Promissory Note executed by the debtor on December 22, 2000." [a legal conclusion]

Significantly, no business records of Litton or RFREH are actually proffered as evidence in support of the motion. Declarant Rexford merely recounts her conclusions. She doesn't even claim to be a custodian of any of the unidentified records she states she has reviewed.

When was bankruptcy specialist Rexford hired by Litton? When did Litton become the servicer for RFREH? When and from whom did RFREH, or Litton for that matter, acquire any of the records bankruptcy specialist Rexford purports to have reviewed? Specifically, which documents and entries in the purported records did she review and why should we believe that said documents qualify as business records of Litton?

Debtor hereby objection to admissibility of bankruptcy specialist Rexford's formulaic recitation in attempts to satisfy FRE 901(a). Nothing meaningful is stated regarding the declarant's qualifications to authenticate business records or the reliability of those records in this instance. She doesn't even identify which records she has consulted.

Which of the matters she recounts does she knows to be true of her own knowledge? Which did she gain from someone's business records?

Bankruptcy specialist Rexford does not assert that either RFREH, or Litton, is in possession of the original promissory note. Nor does she assert that the unauthenticated copy attached to her declaration is a copy of the original rather than merely a copy of a copy which, based on its appearance, is plainly what it is. If it is merely a copy of a copy, then who has possession of the original?